fix: make material required in DotTransaction.fromHex/fromBytes#219
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fix: make material required in DotTransaction.fromHex/fromBytes#219
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Without material, the parser silently falls back to guessing the signed extension layout (assumes era + nonce + tip only). On chains with additional extensions (AuthorizeCall, StorageWeightReclaim, CheckMetadataHash, ChargeAssetTxPayment), this causes extra extension bytes to leak into call_data, producing silently corrupted transactions. All existing callers already pass material. Making it required turns a silent data corruption bug into a compile-time error. BTC-3062
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davidkaplanbitgo
approved these changes
Mar 19, 2026
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Summary
Make
materiala required parameter inDotTransaction.fromHex()andDotTransaction.fromBytes()instead of optional.Without material, the parser silently falls back to guessing the signed extension layout (era + nonce + tip only). On chains with additional extensions (AuthorizeCall, StorageWeightReclaim, CheckMetadataHash, ChargeAssetTxPayment), extra extension bytes leak into call_data, producing silently corrupted transactions that the runtime rejects with a panic.
All existing callers already pass material. This turns a silent data corruption bug into a compile-time error.
Ticket: BTC-3062