cues.fire: auto_verify + sha256 constant-cost path (Phase 2 follow-on B + bonus)

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ All notable changes to cueapi-sdk will be documented here.
 
 ### Added
 
+- **`client.cues.fire(auto_verify=False)` body-verify mirror — OPT-IN (Mike body-verify directive 2026-05-11).** Parallel to `MessagesResource.send(auto_verify=True)`. Default OFF for cues fire because substrate's `/v1/cues/{id}/fire` echoes a pydantic-after-parse body that may include server-side default-population (verified empirically against staging CI ~23:48Z); diffing client's canonical-JSON vs substrate's parsed-defaulted echo would cause spurious mismatch. Callers can opt-in via `auto_verify=True` when they know substrate echo semantics match client serialization (typical for sha256-based constant-cost path). Implementation includes sha256 hex compare (constant-cost) with string-compare fallback on hash drift. On confirmed drift raises `BodyVerifyMismatchError` with diagnostic attributes including `message_id` (= execution_id for fire). Defensive isinstance handles both dict (pre-substrate-fix) and string (post-fix 2026-05-11 ~23:48Z) wire shapes. When cueapi-primary locks per-field echo semantics for fire, default will flip to True.
 - **`client.messages.send(auto_verify=True)` body-verify defense (Mike directive 2026-05-11).** New `auto_verify` kwarg, default `True`. When set, the SDK sends `X-CueAPI-Verify-Echo: true` request header. Substrate-side (Phase 1; cueapi-core's lane) echoes the body it received back in the response under `body_received`. SDK diffs sent vs received and raises `BodyVerifyMismatchError` on drift (with `sent_body`, `received_body`, `first_divergence_byte`, `message_id` attributes for programmatic recovery / diagnostic output). Catches the caller-side shell-expansion bug class where `body=f"... {dynamic_var} ..."` or worse `body=os.popen(...)` silently mutated body content upstream. Opt-out via `auto_verify=False` for perf-sensitive flows. Backward-compat: SDK no-ops when substrate omits the echo field (pre-Layer-1 behavior unchanged). New helper: `cueapi.exceptions.first_divergence_byte(a, b)` returns the byte index of the first differing position (pure function; re-usable cross-SDK).
 - `client.cues.bulk_delete(ids)` — delete up to 100 cues in a single call. Returns `{"deleted": [...], "skipped": [...]}`. Per-ID atomic, not batch atomic. Sends `X-Confirm-Destructive: true` header automatically. Wraps `POST /v1/cues/bulk-delete` (cueapi #650). Parity port of cueapi-cli #46. Raises `ValueError` client-side on empty list or > 100 IDs.
 

cueapi/resources/cues.py

@@ -2,14 +2,26 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import hashlib
+import json
 from datetime import datetime
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Dict, List, Optional, Union
 
+from cueapi.exceptions import BodyVerifyMismatchError, first_divergence_byte
 from cueapi.models.cue import Cue, CueList
 
 if TYPE_CHECKING:
     from cueapi.client import CueAPI
 
+# Phase 2 of body-verify defense in depth (Mike directive 2026-05-11).
+# Substrate echoes the request body bytes back in body_received (str)
+# + body_received_sha256 (64-hex SHA256 of the same bytes) when the
+# X-CueAPI-Verify-Echo: true request header is set. Field names locked
+# during joint design (CMA + cueapi-primary) on Dock workspace
+# cue-message-silent-corruption-substrate-design-2026-05-11.
+_VERIFY_ECHO_BODY_FIELD = "body_received"
+_VERIFY_ECHO_SHA256_FIELD = "body_received_sha256"
+
 
 class CuesResource:
     """Manage cues (scheduled tasks)."""
@@ -273,6 +285,7 @@ def fire(
         send_at: Optional[Union[str, datetime]] = None,
         exit_criteria: Optional[List[str]] = None,
         idempotency_key: Optional[str] = None,
+        auto_verify: bool = False,
     ) -> Dict[str, Any]:
         """Fire an existing cue, optionally overriding payload + scheduling.
 
@@ -344,4 +357,83 @@ def fire(
         if idempotency_key is not None:
             body["idempotency_key"] = idempotency_key
 
-        return self._client._post(f"/v1/cues/{cue_id}/fire", json=body)
+        # Phase 2 of body-verify defense in depth (Mike directive 2026-05-11).
+        # Substrate echoes request body bytes back as body_received (str) +
+        # body_received_sha256 (64-hex SHA256) when X-CueAPI-Verify-Echo:
+        # true header is set. We compute the same SHA256 client-side over
+        # our request body JSON + compare hex (constant cost) — falls back
+        # to string compare on body_received string if available. Mirrors
+        # MessagesResource.send auto_verify pattern.
+        headers: Dict[str, str] = {}
+        sent_body_bytes: Optional[bytes] = None
+        if auto_verify:
+            headers["X-CueAPI-Verify-Echo"] = "true"
+            # Pre-compute canonical JSON bytes for the verify-echo
+            # comparison. Server hashes the body bytes it received;
+            # this client hashes the body bytes we send. Match should
+            # be byte-identical if no transport-layer mutation occurred.
+            sent_body_bytes = json.dumps(body, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+
+        response = self._client._post(
+            f"/v1/cues/{cue_id}/fire", json=body, headers=headers
+        )
+
+        # Verify echo if requested. Defensive isinstance handles both
+        # current substrate (flat string post-fix 2026-05-11 ~23:48Z)
+        # and the earlier dict-shape variant + the no-echo backward-
+        # compat path.
+        if auto_verify and isinstance(response, dict) and sent_body_bytes is not None:
+            received_raw = response.get(_VERIFY_ECHO_BODY_FIELD)
+            received_str: Optional[str] = None
+            if isinstance(received_raw, str):
+                received_str = received_raw
+            elif isinstance(received_raw, dict):
+                # Pre-fix wire shape: serialize for compare. Future-
+                # proof in case any deployment still ships the dict.
+                received_str = json.dumps(received_raw, separators=(",", ":"))
+
+            # Prefer constant-cost SHA256 comparison when both server +
+            # client compute the same digest. Falls back to string
+            # compare if the sha field is absent.
+            sha_field = response.get(_VERIFY_ECHO_SHA256_FIELD)
+            mismatch_detected = False
+            if isinstance(sha_field, str) and len(sha_field) == 64:
+                # Server's sha256 hashes the raw request bytes it
+                # received. We compute over our locally-serialized
+                # bytes. JSON-canonicalization differences (key order,
+                # whitespace) could cause spurious mismatch — so on
+                # sha mismatch, fall back to string-compare which is
+                # more forgiving on serialization differences.
+                client_sha = hashlib.sha256(sent_body_bytes).hexdigest()
+                if client_sha != sha_field:
+                    # SHA mismatch — verify with string compare; if THAT
+                    # also fails, it's a real divergence.
+                    if received_str is not None and received_str != json.dumps(
+                        body, separators=(",", ":")
+                    ):
+                        mismatch_detected = True
+            else:
+                # No sha field; compare body_received string vs our
+                # canonical body JSON.
+                if received_str is not None and received_str != json.dumps(
+                    body, separators=(",", ":")
+                ):
+                    mismatch_detected = True
+
+            if mismatch_detected and received_str is not None:
+                exec_id = response.get("id", "<unknown>")
+                sent_str = json.dumps(body, separators=(",", ":"))
+                divergence = first_divergence_byte(sent_str, received_str)
+                if divergence == -1 and len(sent_str) != len(received_str):
+                    divergence = min(len(sent_str), len(received_str))
+                raise BodyVerifyMismatchError(
+                    f"Cue fire body received by substrate ({len(received_str)} bytes) differs "
+                    f"from body sent ({len(sent_str)} bytes); first divergence at byte "
+                    f"{divergence}. Likely cause: caller-side mutation of payload_override or "
+                    f"send_at fields before reaching the SDK. Inspect the dict you constructed.",
+                    sent_body=sent_str,
+                    received_body=received_str,
+                    first_divergence_byte=divergence,
+                    message_id=exec_id,  # execution id for fire (NOT message id)
+                )
+        return response

tests/test_cues_resource.py

@@ -6,14 +6,23 @@
 
 
 class TestFire:
+    """Default ``auto_verify=False`` for ``CuesResource.fire`` — substrate's
+    /v1/cues/{id}/fire echoes a pydantic-after-parse body that may include
+    server-side default-population, causing spurious diff vs caller's
+    canonical-JSON serialization. Until field-by-field echo semantic is
+    locked with cueapi-primary, fire's auto_verify is opt-in via explicit
+    kwarg. TestFireAutoVerify class below pins the opt-in verify behavior."""
+
     def test_fire_no_payload_override(self):
         mock_client = MagicMock()
         mock_client._post.return_value = {"id": "exec_test", "status": "queued"}
         resource = CuesResource(mock_client)
 
         result = resource.fire("cue_abc123")
 
-        mock_client._post.assert_called_once_with("/v1/cues/cue_abc123/fire", json={})
+        mock_client._post.assert_called_once_with(
+            "/v1/cues/cue_abc123/fire", json={}, headers={},
+        )
         assert result["id"] == "exec_test"
 
     def test_fire_with_payload_override_only(self):
@@ -27,6 +36,7 @@ def test_fire_with_payload_override_only(self):
         mock_client._post.assert_called_once_with(
             "/v1/cues/cue_abc123/fire",
             json={"payload_override": payload},
+            headers={},
         )
 
     def test_fire_with_payload_override_and_merge_strategy(self):
@@ -40,8 +50,91 @@ def test_fire_with_payload_override_and_merge_strategy(self):
         mock_client._post.assert_called_once_with(
             "/v1/cues/cue_abc123/fire",
             json={"payload_override": payload, "merge_strategy": "replace"},
+            headers={},
+        )
+
+
+class TestFireAutoVerify:
+    """Phase 2 cues fire auto-verify (Mike body-verify directive 2026-05-11).
+
+    Mirrors MessagesResource.send pattern. Substrate echoes back the request
+    body bytes under body_received + sha256 hex under body_received_sha256.
+    SDK compares + raises BodyVerifyMismatchError on drift.
+    """
+
+    def test_default_off_omits_verify_echo_header(self):
+        """auto_verify defaults to False on fire (substrate echo semantics
+        not yet locked for /v1/cues/{id}/fire; opt-in until field-by-field
+        semantic confirmed with cueapi-primary)."""
+        mock_client = MagicMock()
+        mock_client._post.return_value = {"id": "exec_x"}
+        resource = CuesResource(mock_client)
+
+        resource.fire("cue_abc")
+
+        headers = mock_client._post.call_args.kwargs.get("headers", {})
+        assert "X-CueAPI-Verify-Echo" not in headers
+
+    def test_opt_in_adds_verify_echo_header(self):
+        mock_client = MagicMock()
+        mock_client._post.return_value = {"id": "exec_x"}
+        resource = CuesResource(mock_client)
+
+        resource.fire("cue_abc", auto_verify=True)
+
+        headers = mock_client._post.call_args.kwargs.get("headers", {})
+        assert headers.get("X-CueAPI-Verify-Echo") == "true"
+
+    def test_byte_identical_sha256_passes(self):
+        """When server's body_received_sha256 matches client's computed
+        sha256, send() returns response normally (constant-cost path).
+        Requires explicit auto_verify=True since fire defaults to off."""
+        import hashlib
+        import json
+        # Compute expected sha256 of the canonical request body
+        body_payload = {"payload_override": {"task": "test"}}
+        expected_sha = hashlib.sha256(
+            json.dumps(body_payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+        ).hexdigest()
+        mock_client = MagicMock()
+        mock_client._post.return_value = {
+            "id": "exec_x",
+            "body_received": json.dumps(body_payload, separators=(",", ":")),
+            "body_received_sha256": expected_sha,
+        }
+        resource = CuesResource(mock_client)
+
+        result = resource.fire(
+            "cue_abc", payload_override={"task": "test"}, auto_verify=True
         )
 
+        assert result["id"] == "exec_x"
+
+    def test_no_op_when_substrate_omits_echo_field(self):
+        """Pre-Layer-1 substrate (or default-off path) omits echo → no raise."""
+        mock_client = MagicMock()
+        mock_client._post.return_value = {"id": "exec_x"}
+        resource = CuesResource(mock_client)
+
+        result = resource.fire("cue_abc", auto_verify=True)
+
+        assert result["id"] == "exec_x"
+
+    def test_default_off_skips_verify_even_if_substrate_echoes(self):
+        """Default auto_verify=False: even if substrate sends body_received
+        (e.g. caller targets a different SDK that opted in), this call
+        doesn't check. Pins the default-off invariant."""
+        mock_client = MagicMock()
+        mock_client._post.return_value = {
+            "id": "exec_x",
+            "body_received": "completely different body",
+        }
+        resource = CuesResource(mock_client)
+
+        result = resource.fire("cue_abc")  # default auto_verify=False
+
+        assert result["id"] == "exec_x"
+
     def test_fire_omits_merge_strategy_when_not_passed(self):
         # When the caller omits merge_strategy, the wrapper must NOT send a
         # client-side default. The server's Pydantic default of "merge"